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ABSTRACT. This article is concerned with challenges to reforming the
voting procedures of the Council of the European Union (EU). The next
major waves of EU enlargement will cause the Union to increase to a
membership of first twenty-one, and then twenty-six or possibly even more
states. How does enlargement affect the Council’s inherent "capacity to
act" under the currently used qualified majority voting rule? It is demon-
strated here that the expected increase in EU membership will most likely
induce a larger "status quo bias" as compared to the present situation in
the Council if the crucial majority decision quota is not lowered. In
addition, the article is responding to some criticism that has been applied
against assessing the leverage of EU governments in one of the EU’s most
important institutions: the Council of the EU. By resorting to techniques
that capture the influence of a priori coalitions on the one hand and
"connected coalitions" among EU governments on the other&mdash;applying n-
person cooperative game theory&mdash;the piece illustrates how the assessment
of relative voting leverage in the framework of weighted voting systems
may be extended and applied to situations in which the specific distribu-
tion of members’ preferences is known. These calculations are again
relevant in the face of the upcoming rounds of EU enlargement and
projects for institutional reform.
Introduction
The institutions of the European Union (EU) are in need of major reform. Before
the next round of enlargement takes place in the first years of the new millennium,
a series of crucial institutional challenges must be met. Among the most important
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are the issue of reducing the total number of representatives in the European
Commission; finding a new balance of influence among the EU’s institutions; and
finally, agreement on a new scheme of votes and representation for the member
states in the Council of the EU.
This article is concerned mainly with challenges that the Council faces. More
specifically, it asks two broad questions with respect to concerns in the face of
upcoming enlargement: (1) how does the present voting scheme used in the Council
affect the relative influence of EU governments, especially under the assumption
that members form certain a priori coalitions? And (2) how is the Council affected
by enlargement if it basically maintains its present voting schemes?
Since qualified majority voting has become more important in the Council of the
European Union (EU), incentives to form coalitions among EU member states may
have increased. When several more members are admitted to the Union, this trend
can be expected to continue and strengthen. Therefore, this article analyzes effects
of this development and indicates repercussions on members’ relative influence in
the Council’s voting procedures. Moreover, enlargement is likely to affect the
Council’s overall &dquo;capacity to act.&dquo; This crucial issue is also addressed in this article.
If preferences of different actors in the Union or even just in the Council were
known a priori on a vast range of issue areas (at least on an ordinal scale), other
factors such as agenda-setting power and its effects on policy outcomes could be
analyzed rather precisely.’ Unfortunately, however, preferences of the various actors
involved are not likely to be known on a vast range of issues, especially with an EU
membership of 15 or more. In addition, there are legitimate doubts on whether
these preferences would be revealed sincerely and whether they would be stable in
the course of the negotiations. Finally, assessing preferences of 15 or more EU
members in various policy fields is a challenging empirical task; larger efforts to
collect data on this crucial topic may improve research on this theme in the future.
Apart from possible agenda-setting power, an analysis of the influence of member
states and of coalitions in the framework of qualified majority votes, even when
reduced to a single institution, is more complex than it may appear at first sight.
In particular, as several studies have highlighted, voting weights are insufficient
measures of voting power, since the constellation of membership and the definition
of the relevant &dquo;quota&dquo; (or decision rule) in a voting body crucially affect the actors’
relative leverage. Weighted voting is indeed rather important in the Council:
although formal votes are not always taken, the distribution of relative voting power
significantly influences the actual bargaining processes in the Council. Current
debates on how to re-allocate votes in the face of enlargement point to the central-
ity of this issue and further negotiations on institutional reform can be expected.
The percentage of votes needed to support a proposal affects an institution’s
inherent &dquo;capacity to act,&dquo; and thus its relative degree of &dquo;status quo bias.&dquo; This is
an essential issue for the EU in the face of forthcoming rounds of enlargement: the
addition of several new EU members, in fact, might significantly increase the diffi-
culty of passing bills in the Union, and hence render decision-making more &dquo;conser-
vative&dquo; on average. This situation, however, is also affected by the relative status
and strength of the different EU institutions in the overall institutional framework
of the EU.
Although the location of preferences in spatial terms is not likely to be known
for a large group of members on several policy issues (and, to add to complexity,
the policy-scale may clearly be multi-dimensional rather than uni-dimensional) it
can be observed in practice that some EU members, in general, are more inclined
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to form coalitions than others. This article, therefore, extends the analysis of more
regular voting power assessments-attempts to assess the effects on members of
weighted voting schemes-to take the probability into account that some members
are more inclined to build coalitions or even &dquo;voting blocs.&dquo; In addition, repercus-
sions are analyzed when members are assumed to build &dquo;connected coalitions&dquo;
rather than coalitions formed at random. The article will consider the crucial issue
of how enlargement influences the relative ease of making decisions within the
Council; this analysis is followed by suggestions to adapt the current voting rules,
intended to provide background information for the upcoming negotiations on insti-
tutional revision.
The article is structured as follows. The first section presents the foundations of
some &dquo;original&dquo; power indices and adaptations capable of taking a priori probabil-
ities of coalition-formation into account. With these extensions, the relative lever-
age of a priori unions can be assessed. The next section sketches tendencies with
respect to members’ preferences and the formation of coalitions among EU govern-
ments, as they have been observed in practice, partially on the basis of some empir-
ical data on voting outcomes in the Council. This section also provides information
on assessments when members are assumed to form &dquo;connected coalitions&dquo; rather
than just any type of coalition, and some caveats with respect to this issue. The
article then demonstrates and discusses the calculations on relative voting power
for both individual members and coalitions of members, for the EU’s past and
present on the basis of these different methodological approaches. It then turns to
the issue of the Council’s relative capacity to act, or inherent &dquo;status quo bias,&dquo;
with changes in the total number of members, finding that the current qualified
majority quota significantly affects the Council’s capacity to reach decisions,
especially when several more members join the Union. The findings of the study
are summarized in the Conclusion.
Power Indices and A Priori Probabilities of Coalition Formation
Two well-known and by now almost &dquo;traditional&dquo; indices of voting power measure
the relative leverage of members within a weighted voting system: the Shapley-
Shubik index and the Banzhaf power index.’ As do several other indices in this
category, they basically provide a &dquo;preference neutral&dquo; analysis, that is, they consider
the occurrence of any coalition among members to be equiprobable.’ Hence, they
abstract from specific distributions of preferences and refer to the &dquo;skeleton&dquo; of insti-
tutional design. Both of these indices, however, can be extended to take the forma-
tion of a priori unions into account,’ if this is considered desirable.
On the basis of empirical observations, one may assign, for instance, an a priori
probability p to the formation of a respective &dquo;voting alliance.&dquo; The values of the
new and adapted game can then be calculated as’
where ai represents the power index for a player i in the game with an a priori
coalition structure and Pi the respective value in the &dquo;original&dquo; weighted voting
game.
Another possibility to account for members’ preferences consists in taking only
&dquo;connected coalitions&dquo; (see Axelrod, 1970) into account. This basically implies that
coalitions are only considered to be viable when they are composed of members that
are adjacent on a (uni-dimensional) policy scale. Hence, adaptations in this sense
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may be very helpful when applied to the EU context when studying national parlia-
ments or the European Parliament (see Colomer and Hosli, 1999). But, generally,
it may be somewhat less useful when applied to the Council of the EU.6
Generally, the inclusion of the assumption that only connected coalitions form
among members poses no technical challenge in terms of calculating adapted power
indices. The difficulty with working with such extended indices is rather of a
theoretical nature. For instance, with respect to the Banzhaf power index, there
may be doubts on how well members may be able to make the threat of a &dquo;critical
defection&dquo; (a defection from a coalition that would be winning, but without the
support of the member concerned cannot reach the required majority): if members,
generally, form coalitions that are adjacent on a policy scale, it is questionable
whether the &dquo;center&dquo; players can act credibly when threatening not to support the
coalition, as this might harm the attainment of their own policy goals. Presumably,
members adjacent on a policy scale hold more similar policy priorities than those
further away in spatial terms. Another challenge of this extension, evidently,
consists in correctly assessing the distribution of members’ preferences on the
respective scales’-a challenging empirical venture. Nonetheless, in order to
respond to such criticism, it will be attempted here to show some effects when
connected coalitions rather than any type of coalition are assumed to form.
Which coalitions among members have formed in practice? Unfortunately, data
bases containing information on members’ preferences in the Eu are still rather
scarce. However, the following section provides some indications and empirical data
on the formation of coalitions among EU governments that have formed in the
framework of the Council’s voting procedures in practice. These assessments,
evidently, cannot provide a full picture on voting behavior in the Council. But since
some voting outcomes have been published, starting in 1993, it is at least possible
to see who voted for or against an issue. Unfortunately, data for later years appear
to have the bias that members knew results were going to be published: signifi-
cantly fewer governments formally voted against proposals in the Council in 1994
through the present than they did in 1993. Therefore, this study will use the 1993
data set, although, by necessity, it can only provide a partial picture of reality.
Preferences and Coalition-formation: Some Empirical Evidence
In the EU, intergovernmental bargaining is crucial, while other factors are also
relevant in the determination of policy outcomes.’ Policy decisions are often
outcomes of intensive bargaining and negotiation processes. The actors involved in
the overall bargaining game are not only national government representatives, but
also officials of the different EU institutions, most notably the European Commis-
sion and the European Parliament. Moreover, actors such as national and transna-
tional lobbying groups appear to play a prominent role.’ Accordingly, negotiations
that precede decisions in the Council are usually characterized by long and
sometimes tedious processes.’° Because of the connection between domestic inter-
ests and intergovernmental developments in the Union, bargaining may best be
conceived in the sense of two-level games (Putnam, 1988), in which domestic policy
preferences determine the intergovernmental bargaining behavior of EU members.
Evidently, in this framework, changing domestic preferences may alter the forma-
tion of coalitions on the intergovernmental level (Moravcsik, 1993).
The introduction of majority voting in the Council is likely to have changed the
negotiating behavior of the member states. Although formal votes are not
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frequently resorted to, the option of applying a majority vote has altered the
decision-making reality for the EU member states. This change has certainly also
affected decision processes in the Committee of the Permanent Representatives of
the Member States (COREPER), a body at the ambassadorial level, which can either
make decisions itself or pass them on to the Council.&dquo;
Within the framework of unanimous decisions taken on the basis of the Luxem-
bourg compromise, the negative vote of one member was evidently sufficient to
block a proposal, so that the requirement of unanimity basically granted all
members a veto right. By contrast, qualified majority votes require the formation
of a &dquo;blocking minority&dquo; to prevent a decision from being adopted. In the present
constellation of EU membership, a blocking minority consists of at least 26 out of
the total of 87 (weighted) votes (or 23 votes when the Ioannina Compromise
applies).’2 Correspondingly, in order to support a proposal, a coalition of members
needs to be formed that represents a minimum fraction of total weighted votes. In
the present constellation, this is 62 out of 87 votes (or approximately 71 percent).13
Experiences of the recent past reveal that traditional geographical alliances
between member states of the Union may have lost some of their significance. For
example, the three Benelux countries, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands,
which largely acted as a bloc in the first decades of the Community’s existence, have
started to advocate somewhat different attitudes toward policy issues. The issue of
re-weighting votes itself recently constituted a prominent example in this respect.
Similarly, classic cooperation between France and Germany, the &dquo;Paris-Bonn axis,&dquo;
may be less important today, with an EU encompassing several more EU members
than it did in the beginning of the Community. However, this crucial tandem is still
significant when it comes to taking actual policy initiatives, its agenda-setting power
somewhat exceeding its formal influence in the voting procedures.
With the overall extension of the Union’s policy competencies and because of
divergent interests of member states in specific sectors, geographical alliances
within the Union may thus be somewhat less important today than they were
earlier. Nonetheless, there are some &dquo;traditional&dquo; patterns of cooperation among
some of the present EU members that are likely to be preserved in the future. For
example, it has been observed in practice that decisions were rarely taken against
an alliance built by Germany and France.
An Eu with 15 members is evidently more heterogeneous in character and implies
other possibilities for coalition building than did the Community of six, nine, ten or
twelve, a trend that will certainly continue with the forthcoming rounds of enlarge-
ment. Ideal points of new members on selected issues can, at least in the first years
after the next enlargement, be expected to be at a distance from those of most of
the present EU members. But the picture, certainly, is dynamic. Some of the richer
states in the current EU were relatively poor after World War II; some of the likely
new EU members, mainly in Central Europe, may shift to a different economic
position over time, so that distributions of preferences are also dynamic rather than
static. Similarly, the division between the &dquo;South&dquo; and the &dquo;North&dquo; in the EU, and
soon between the &dquo;West&dquo; and the &dquo;East,&dquo; may experience changes over time. No
coalition or divide is likely to remain stable over decades in the Council.
Which coalitions have formed in the Council in the past? What evidence is avail-
able ? Have some members been more inclined to cast negative votes in the voting
procedures? Although empirical data on the voting behavior in the Council have
only recently been made public, it is possible to derive some impressions on the




an overview of voting behavior in the period between early December 1993 and late
December 1994. In fact, the decision to publish results was only taken at the very
end of 1994. The data refer to different compositions of the Council, such as the
Council of Agricultural Ministers, the Transportation Council, or the Council of
Economic and Financial Affairs (EcoFin Council). As the table demonstrates,
weighted voting applies to several policy issues and domains-hence, the relevant
issue space is rather likely to be more than uni-dimensional.
Table la illustrates which members have either cast a negative vote or abstained
with respect to specific issues.&dquo; In general, voting was on regulations or directives
that were to be adopted by the respective composition of the Council. It can be seen
that generally, only a few members opposed a specific proposal. Although some
members were more often part of an opposing (or &dquo;losing&dquo;) coalition, such as the
United Kingdom, the table illustrates that all EU members have either opposed an
issue against a large coalition of other EU members or abstained from voting on at
least one issue. For instance, Spain shows a relatively high number of abstentions
with respect to fisheries, and both Denmark and Greece have cast quite a few
negative votes in various issue areas.
Table lb shows for each policy area the kind of losing coalitions of EU govern-
ments formed.
Some members appear to be in losing coalitions more frequently than others;
countries such as Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands seem to coordinate
their positions fairly often. But generally there is little indication of clear patterns
of coalition formation among selected EU member states,&dquo; at least for the time
period assessed here.
Voting Alliances and Voting Leverage in the Council
With the exception of the European Community’s first expansion in 1973, enlarge-
ment did not cause a change in the individual voting weights as attributed to the
member states in the Council.&dquo; Similarly, the requirement to form a qualified
majority was always adapted to approximately 71 percent of the total vote. There-
fore, in relative terms, the share of individual members in the total vote has
decreased with an increase in membership. Similarly, the percentage of votes
needed to form a blocking minority has somewhat decreased, from 35.3 in the origi-
nal constellation of membership to 29.9 percent at present.17 The following calcu-
lations are based on the number of members’ votes throughout the history of the
EU. In order to assist these calculations, Table 2 presents an overview of the distri-
bution of votes and the requirement for forming either a qualified majority or a
blocking minority for the different constellations of membership in the EU’s past.
The respective changes in voting power for the different stages in the EU’s history,
as assessed by the normalized Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik power indices, are
shown in Table 3.
As measured by these more &dquo;conventional&dquo; indices of a priori voting power, the
relative leverage of countries has decreased with the overall increase in the number
of members. In the first constellation of Community membership, the largest
members each held almost one-fourth of total voting power (measured by either
index). By contrast, in the present situation, their share is only 11.7 percent
(Shapley-Shubik index) or 11.2 percent (Banzhaf index). Similarly, the Netherlands
started out with a share in voting power of 15 percent (Shapley-Shubik index) or
14.3 percent (Banzhaf index), but its Banzhaf power index dropped to 5.9 percent
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TABLE 2. Distribution of Votes and the Requirement for a Qualified Majority in the Council of the EU.
in the present constellation of members (5.5 percent as measured by the Shapley-
Shubik index).
As far as the leverage of coalitions is concerned, it can be seen that France and
Germany together held almost half of total voting power in the beginning of the
Community’s existence, as measured by the sum of their individual indices. But
their combined influence has dropped to about one-fourth in the period 1986-94
and presently it is approximately 23 percent. The Benelux countries combined an
individual voting power of about 30 percent in the period between 1958 and 1973,
but in the present constellation of EU membership, the sum of their individual
Shapley-Shubik power indices is only 13.1 percent (or 14.1 percent as measured by
the sum of their individual normalized Banzhaf indices).
Table 4 presents the situation in which each alliance-the Benelux countries,’~ 8
the &dquo;Paris-Bonn axis&dquo;,&dquo; the &dquo;cohesion countries 1120 (since 1986) and the &dquo;Nordics&dquo;2’
(since 1995)-are assumed to constitute a fixed voting alliance.22 It illustrates that
the &dquo;Franco-German Alliance,&dquo; viewed as an a priori union, has lost relative voting
power between the inception of the Community and the present. By contrast, the
Benelux members as a &dquo;voting bloc&dquo; gained with the EU’s enlargement by Denmark,
Ireland, and the UK in 1973. In contrast to other voting alliances, this group of
countries was also able to increase its share in voting power as a bloc in the frame-
work of the most recent enlargement. The &dquo;South&dquo; and the Franco-German alliance
at present hold equal shares in overall voting leverage. The influence of the
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TABLE 3. The Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik Power Indices for Qualified Majority Votes in the
Council of the EU (in percent).
&dquo;Nordics&dquo; as a voting bloc now equals that of the UK or Italy as individual members.
The first constellation of Community members enabled France and Germany to gain
a large increase in voting power through the formation of a voting bloc: their collective
Shapley-Shubik index was 66.7 percent as compared to 46.7 percent when summed over
their individual shares (or 60 percent as contrasted to 47.6 percent when measured by
the normalized Banzhaf index). In contrast, building an alliance did not support the
relative position of the Benelux countries as a union, measured by either index.
Moreover, one can assume that a particular pattern of coalition formation recurs in
several constellations of the Council (although empirical evidence, at least for the early
1990s, does not appear to provide support for this assumption). For instance, a group
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TABLE 4. Voting Power of A Priori Voting Alliances in the Council of the EU.
(BanxJtaf Index in percent; Shaplg-Shubik Index in brackets)
of countries might be considered to be &dquo;laggards&dquo; and others &dquo;pro-integrationist,&dquo; as
this is often done in the framework of spatial analyses of decision-making as applied
to the EU. In an oversimplified example, assume that a policy scale would rank
members from &dquo;least integrationist&dquo; to (most) &dquo;integrationist&dquo;.23 The UK and Denmark
might then, for instance, be viewed as being &dquo;least integrationist&dquo; (a classification that
may hold, for instance, with respect to integration in the field of security, but certainly
not in a domain such as market liberalization). Some members, such as France and
Germany, would be classed in the center; others, such as Italy and Spain, will be consid-
ered &dquo;integrationist.&dquo; Again, this classification would need revision with respect to
quite a few aspects, such as in the domain of fisheries in the case of Spain or in some
environmental matters in the case of Italy. For the present 15 EU members, a prefer-
ence distribution can be assumed on a respective policy scale. We will work with such
a scale to present some effects in terms of the assessments of relative voting leverage.
For a &dquo;left-right&dquo; policy-scale UK - DM - S - FI - A - L - NL - B - G - F - Irl - Gr
- P - I - sp2t-and under the assumption that only connected coalitions fbrm~&horbar;
Table 5 demonstrates the respective_ assessments for the (modified) normalized
Banzhaf power index as compared to the original index. To demonstrate the effects
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TABLE 5. Connected as Compared to Non-connected Coalitions: Adapted Normalized Banzhaf Indices for
the Council.
Note: In this rather specific example, the location of members’ policy preferences on a uni-dimensional
policy scale is assumed to be (from left to right):
UK - DM - S - FI - A - L - NL - B - G - F - Irl - Gr - P - I - SP. Only connected coalitions are
taken into consideration and &dquo;critical defections&dquo; are made on the basis of members’ weight, i.e. their
number of votes, in the framework of connected coalitions.
more clearly, the simple majority rule (based, however, on weighted votes), and the
present qualified majority quota (62 votes) are distinguished.
If only connected coalitions are assumed to form, as assessed on the basis of this
specific policy scale and preference distribution among EU governments, voting
power tends to shift toward the members located in the center of the scale.
However, this effect materializes to a larger extent in the framework of the simple
majority rule than for the actual present qualified majority quota. Technically, it
is not difficult to assess members’ relative voting power on the basis of such more
restrictive assumptions. The weak part of such an endeavor is, however, that the
location of the policy preferences of the EU governments will not normally follow
such clear-cut patterns, but will vary from one policy domain to another. More data
to assess EU governments’ preferences, more data on actual coalition-formation
processes, and more statistical analysis of voting behavior in the Council are needed
to guide the analysis toward remaining with the assumption that the coalition
formation process among EU governments in the Council essentially follows a
random pattern or assumes specific patterns of a priori coalitions.
Qualified Majority Voting and Relative Status Quo Bias
In this section the efficiency and flexibility of some institutional rules of the present
EU-and earlier constellations in its membership-will be analyzed and then
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extended to study options for a reform of the present system. With respect to
decision-making in the Council, the main tool to be applied here is a calculation of
the probability that a randomly selected coalition among the EU member states will
meet the decision quota (the majority requirement in the Council’s voting process).
This approach essentially provides figures on the proportion of winning coalitions
in all possible coalitions among EU member states.26
The measure provided in this section largely disregards political variables and
estimates about the likelihood that specific coalitions will form because of a partic-
ular distribution of preferences: these conditions may change in the course of time
(for instance, because of shifts in government or changes in the constellation of
domestic political parties). Moreover, it is difficult to assess clear patterns of coali-
tion formation on the basis of currently existing empirical evidence, as has been
shown above.
Formally, the existence of a winning coalition can be described in the framework
of simple games&dquo; (on the following, compare van Deemen, 1989). A simple game is
an ordered pair of sets G= (N,U’), where N denotes the player set and W is a set of
coalitions (or subsets of N). An element of W is called a winning coalition&dquo; (corre-
spondingly, the set of losing coalitions will subsequently be denoted by L). Winning
coalitions essentially have the power to control a game and to determine its outcomes.
A weighted majority game is a simple game in which a weight is attributed to
each player. A coalition in such a game is winning if the sum of the weights of the
players in the coalition exceeds or equals the decision rule (the &dquo;quota&dquo; of the
game). A weighted majority game G is represented by G = [q; zey, W2 ..., ~L with q
denoting the quota and r.~i player i’s voting weight. In a weighted majority game, a
winning coalition satisfies the condition
Hence, the collective weight of the individual players in a coalition has to equal
or exceed the required decision quota (q).
The total number of coalitions (combinations) that can be formed out of n
members is 2&dquo;. For instance, in the framework of a three-member voting body, eight
coalitions are possible in practice. With the players labeled A, B, and C respectively,
the following coalitions can form: {~}, fBI, {C}, fA, B}, fA, Cl, fB, Cl, the &dquo;grand
coalition&dquo; {~4, B, C} and the empty set f 4)1. Depending on the relevant decision
rule, however, only some of them are winning.29 Without the empty set, the total
of possible coalitions is 2&dquo; - 1.
For instance, under the unanimity requirement, only the coalition that encom-
passes all members, the &dquo;grand coalition,&dquo; {A, B, Cl, is winning.3° In the framework
of the simple majority rule-here corresponding with the two-thirds majority
requirement-the coalitions ~A, .6}, {A, Cl, fB, C} and ~A,B,C~ are winning.3’ In
the first example, without counting the empty set, the share of winning coalitions
in the total is one in seven, resulting in a figure on the committee’s relative &dquo;capac-
ity to act&dquo; of 14.29 percent. In the second case, four out of seven coalitions are
winning, generating a figure on the capacity to act of 57.14 percent, indicating a
lower barrier to reaching decisions and thus a lower &dquo;status quo bias.&dquo;
The proportion of winning coalitions can be calculated for any voting body and
any number of members.32 Note that this procedure not only includes minimum
winning coalitions (MWCS), but also takes &dquo;oversized coalitions&dquo; into account.33
The EU presently encompasses fifteen member states. As Table 2 illustrates,
qualified majority votes generally require 62 votes out of the total of 87 (a share
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in the total of 71.3 percent). Moreover, some decisions need, apart from a qualified
majority of weighted votes, acceptance by two-thirds of the EU’s member stateS.31
Generally, the Single European Act has increased the areas in which qualified
majority votes can be resorted to. Both the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and
the recent Amsterdam Treaty have reinforced this trend. Some of the most impor-
tant areas in which this rule is applied are those linked to the establishment of the
internal market and to economic issues more generally.
Since qualified majority votes, as compared to the unanimity rule, increase the
Council’s &dquo;capacity to act&dquo; (and hence decrease its relative &dquo;status quo bias&dquo;) there
are incentives to resort to qualified majority votes also in those areas that presently
require unanimous decisions. This is true, for instance, for the domain of taxation
in the framework of the EU’s &dquo;first pillar&dquo; and several areas in the EU’s intergov-
ernmentally structured pillars two and three, viz. Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs 0HA).
With respect to the qualified majority decision rule, the 1995 enlargement has
basically maintained the required &dquo;quota&dquo; in terms of the percentage of total votes
needed to reach decisions in the Council . 15 This suggests that the Council’s ability
to act remained stable. However, this assumption is misleading, as the subsequent
analysis will demonstrate.
The European Parliament, in contrast to the Council, generally decides on the
basis of a simple majority of votes cast.36 With respect to selected issue areas,
however, a two-thirds majority is required (to be exact, a two-thirds majority of the
votes cast, representing a simple majority of the EP’s members). This applies, for
instance, to a motion of censure on the European Commission and to the accep-
tance of the EU’s draft budget. Up to 1999 the European People’s Party (EPP)-the
EP’s Christian-Democratic Group held a total of 173 seats (or 27.6 percent of EP
membership). The largest political group was the European Socialists, with 221
seats (a vote share in the total of 35.3 percent). The third largest group was the
Liberals, with a membership of 53 (or 8.5 percent of the total).
The power of the three largest political groups in the EP and of national repre-
sentations in the framework of the political groups has been analyzed in Peters
(1996a). Effects on the leverage of political groups and national representatives with
respect to the two main decision rules in the EP are studied, for instance, in Raunio
(1996) and Hosli (1997). Generally, the two largest groups are found to have a
strong influence on voting outcomes in the EP.
With respect to the flexibility of decision-making or &dquo;relative status quo bias,&dquo;
enlargement has not-as measured in purely quantitative terms-affected the EP’s
relative &dquo;capacity to act.&dquo; This assessment abstracts, of course, from additional organi-
zational challenges when more members join the EP and from effects on the varia-
tion of members’ preferences. But in quantitative terms, the share of winning
coalitions in the total of possible coalitions remains constant as long as the simple
majority rule applies. Hence, as a proportion of coalitions in the total, an EP encom-
passing 100 members has an equal share of winning coalitions as an EP consisting of
700 members. Diverging preferences among the EP’s members tend to reduce the EP’s
overall &dquo;capacity to act.&dquo; Similarly, consistent patterns of coalition-building among
political groups-with the exception of an occasional voting alliance between the EPP
and the European Socialists, the two large groups that usually meet the decision quota
by themselves-tend to reduce the EP’s inherent &dquo;capacity to act.&dquo;
How strong is the Council’s relative &dquo;capacity to act,&dquo; as assessed by the above
approach? Have the number of EU members and the internal decision rules of the
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TABLE 6. The &dquo;Flexibility&dquo; of Decision-making: The Proportion of Winning Coalitions as Compared to
All Possible Coalitions in the Council from 1958 to the Present (in percent).
Council had an effect on this institution’s &dquo;relative status quo bias&dquo;?&dquo;’? Table 6
presents an overview of the proportion of winning coalitions that could have been
formed among the members when qualified majority votes applied in the EU’s
history.&dquo; In order to allow for comparison, it also lists the respective number of
winning coalitions under the unanimity rule.
Increased membership is likely to have affected the inherent degree of &dquo;status quo
bias&dquo; under the unanimity rule-as it applied with respect to decisions taken either
on the basis of the &dquo;Luxembourg compromise&dquo; or decisions that required unanimity
by the Treaty of Rome, such as taxation and the protection of workers’ rights. Expan-
sion of the EU’s membership, hence, generally resulted in detrimental effects on the
Council’s overall &dquo;capacity to act&dquo; under this requirement. More generally, under
the formal rule of unanimity, one in 63 coalitions (or 1.59 percent) are winning in
the framework of a six-member committee, whereas this proportion decreases to one
in 32 767 (or 0.0031 percent) in an institution encompassing 15 members.
How has the degree of relative &dquo;status quo bias,&dquo; in comparison, changed in the
framework of the Council’s qualified majority rule? Since the proportion of weighted
votes was adapted, with every enlargement, to approximately 71 percent of the
weighted vote total (Table 2), it seems that the inherent &dquo;status quo bias&dquo;-
measured as the share of winning coalitions in all possible coalitions among
members-should have remained constant over time. However, this intuition is
found to be misleading, as Table 6 illustrates. The historical overview indicates that
a rather significant decrease in institutional flexibility has occurred between 1958
and the present. Whereas the share of winning coalitions in the total that could be
formed among Community members was more than one in five (or 22.22 percent)
in the first phase of the Community’s existence, this ratio decreased to 14.68
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percent with the first enlargement and has declined ever since: between 1981 and
1985, the share was 13.69 percent, subsequently dropping to 9.82 percent (1986-94).
In the present constellation of Eu membership, the ratio of winning coalitions to all
coalitions that can be formed among the 15 member states under the qualified
majority rule is merely 7.78 percent. Again, this trend can be expected to continue
with further enlargement.
Hence, resorting to more qualified majority votes in the framework of the 1987
Single European Act (SEA) has facilitated decision-making to some extent, as
analyzed in purely quantitative terms with respect to qualified majority votes in the
Council. This change, however, was partially counterbalanced by the loss in flexi-
bility that accompanied the increase in the Community’s membership.39
How would have the Council’s capacity to act been affected had the option
favored by the United Kingdom and Spain in the negotiations on the 1995 enlarge-
ment been pursued for the present qualified majority threshold in the Council? As
mentioned above, these two members favored the maintenance of a 23-vote require-
ment to form a blocking minority in the framework of the present constellation of
EU membership. This &dquo;quota&dquo; in fact is relevant, as mentioned above, when the
&dquo;Ioannina Compromise&dquo; applies. The analysis as applied to this scenario shows that
&dquo;flexibility&dquo; decreases, compared to the situation in 1986-94, not only from 9.81 to
7.78 percent, but further to 4.71 percent. Hence, whereas the Ioannina Compro-
mise certainly increased the leverage of individual EU members to participate in
&dquo;blocking coalitions,&dquo; it further decreased the Council’s overall &dquo;ability to act.&dquo;
Enlargement by several new members will cause a further increase in the
Council’s inherent degree of &dquo;status quo bias&dquo; under the qualified majority rule.
This trend may be counteracted by possible simplifications of the decision-making
procedures or changes in the EU’s inter-institutional balance of influence. Although
most EU governments are opposed to this option at present, a decrease in the
decision &dquo;quota&dquo; could keep the Council’s current &dquo;status quo bias&dquo; stable with
enhanced membership: if the quota as a percentage of the vote total is not adapted
in an enlarged EU, decision-making in the Council is likely to be more cumbersome
in the future.
Conclusion
Reform of the EU’s institutions is crucial. Several issues are at stake. This article
focuses on the Council of the Eu, by studying repercussions of voting weights and
the decision quota on the distribution of power among the members, and effects on
the Council’s overall &dquo;capacity to act&dquo; in view of enlargement.
The article began by illustrating a possible extension of &dquo;voting power analysis&dquo;
on the basis of the assumption that some members are more likely to form coali-
tions, providing results of the analysis of specific &dquo;a priori unions&dquo; within the EU.
Moreover, consideration of &dquo;connected coalitions&dquo; only--of members adjacent as
assessed on a uni-dimensional policy scale-tends to attribute more voting power
to center players, although more so under the simple majority rule than under the
actual qualified majority quota. (A challenge to restraining the analysis to such a
scale, however, consists in correctly assessing the location of members’ preferences
in the Council with respect to several issue areas, and there are some doubts on
whether the threat of a &dquo;critical defection&dquo; could be credible in this context.)
On the basis of first empirical data, it is shown that clear patterns of coalition
formation appear to be absent in the framework of voting procedures in the Council.
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Some countries may be more inclined to cast negative votes in different cases or to
cooperate occasionally, but in the aggregate, summing over the votes in meetings
of different constellations of the Council-such as the Council of Agricultural
Ministers, the Ministers of Economics and Finance (EcoFin Council), the Ministers
of Trade or of the Environment-the high dimensionality of the policy space facing
EU governments leads to several coalitions among EU members being possible in
practice. Trends for cooperation among some members may nonetheless exist, but
with increased membership, even more partners will be available for the potential
coalition-formation processes.
How has the Council’s relative &dquo;status quo bias,&dquo; more generally, been affected
by enlargement? This article illustrates that the relatively high decision &dquo;quota&dquo; has
decreased the Council’s &dquo;capacity to act&dquo; over time, not only under the unanimity
rule, but also in the framework of the qualified majority requirement. Hence,
enlargement is likely to enhance the Council’s relative &dquo;status quo bias&dquo; under the
current qualified majority voting quota. Only a lowering of the present quota-
although an unpopular suggestion among the EU’s governments-would counteract
this trend.
Notes
1. This is suggested, for instance, in Garrett and Tsebelis (1996).
2. See Shapley and Shubik (1954) and Banzhaf (1965). Both the Banzhaf and the Shapley-
Shubik indices are measures based on the concept of a member’s "pivotalness." They
essentially calculate the proportion of cases in which a committee member can cast a
pivotal vote, i.e., turn a voting coalition from a losing into a winning one, and vice versa.
Generally, in the framework of cooperative n-person games, power indices provide a
measure of the expectation of payoff distributions among the players.
3. To be exact, the Shapley-Shubik index considers coalitions of equal size to be equiprob-
able.
4. On procedures to calculate the indices under the assumption of a priori unions, see Owen
(1977) for the Shapley-Shubik index and Owen (1982) for the Banzhaf power index.
5. Compare Hosli (1996).
6. For a contrary assessment, see Garrett and Tsebelis (1996).
7. In addition, in terms of calculations, there are two main possibilities to assess members’
a priori voting power for such an adapted index: (1) Only connected coalitions are
assumed to form, and members within such coalitions can make critical defections on
the basis of their relative weight; (2) an additional criterion for a critical defection may
consist in a member’s threat of rendering the coalition non-connected. In the latter case,
it might be small members making this critical defection, due to their location in the
center of the relevant policy scale. By contrast, under the first approach, more voting
power is attributed to the larger members. In the framework of the second approach,
moreover, voting power analysis could take the possibility into account that some
members might make "double critical defections"&mdash;on the basis of both spatial location
and relative weight&mdash;which might be corrected for in the calculation of an overall index.
On "double pivotal votes" see, for instance, Hosli (1995).
8. On the following, compare Hosli (1996).
9. On the increasing importance of lobbying groups in the European Union see Julien
(1990), Andersen and Eliassen (1991), Streeck and Schmitter (1991), or Mazey and
Richardson (1993).
10. For an (early) assessment of intergovernmental negotiations in the Community, see
Wallace (1985).
11. A distinction is made between "A-points" and "B-points." On the tasks and the functions
of the COREPER see, for instance, Hayes-Renshaw, Lequ&egrave;sne, and Mayor Lopez (1989).
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12. The principle of extension of present voting weights has met the opposition of the UK
and Spain in the framework of the 1995 enlargement. The solution finally resorted to&mdash;
the "Ioannina compromise"&mdash;implies that members combining at least 23 votes in the
Council may demand further negotiations on an issue if they do not agree with the
decision as taken on the basis of the (adapted) qualified majority rule. In the period
between 1986 and 1994, 23 votes were required to form a blocking minority. In the case
of the UK, a decrease in sovereignty is likely to have been the most crucial reason for its
reluctance to agree to an adaptation of the "quota" to reach a blocking minority. For
Spain, the most probable explanation is that changing the requirement to form a block-
ing minority would have altered the balance between the "North" and the "South" in
the EU.
13. These assessments refer to the case in which decisions are taken in accordance with the
simpler procedural options within the rather tedious overall procedures. That is&mdash;in the
framework of the cooperation procedure&mdash;when the European Parliament has not
rejected a Commission proposal and when the Council does not amend a revised
Commission proposal (these situations, by contrast, would require unanimity in the
Council). In the framework of the co-decision procedure, as introduced by the Treaty on
European Union, the Council can only decide by qualified majority vote when its common
position does not differ from the Commission’s initial proposal and when the Commis-
sion has not delivered a negative opinion on an amendment as proposed by the European
Parliament.
14. These data are based on the period prior to the 1995 enlargement, when the total
number of EU members listed was 12.
15. However, note that Table 1 cannot provide information on members’ actual policy prefer-
ences, apart from the extreme cases in which they either vote in favor of a proposal,
abstain, or cast a negative vote.
16. This section partially draws on Hosli (1996).
17. If a qualified majority is defined to be 71 percent of the vote total, this figure approxi-
mates&mdash;but never reaches&mdash;29 percent. On the importance of members’ ability to join
blocking minorities see Johnston (1995a,b).
18. On developments and cooperation in the framework of the Benelux, see for instance
Pijpers and Vanhoonacker (1997).
19. See Szukala and Wessels (1997).
20. The expression refers to the group of countries that advocated extensive financial
North-South transfers in the framework of the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty.
On cooperation in the framework of the "South," see also Tsakaloyannis (1997).
21. Compare Widgr&eacute;n (1993) or Petersen (1997).
22. On this analysis, compare Hosli (1996).
23. Compare Garrett and Tsebelis (1996).
24. For the abbreviations used for the countries, see Table 1b.
25. "Critical defections" are here only considered on the basis of weight in the framework
of connected coalitions, as described above.
26. On this approach, compare Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Kilgour and Levesque (1984),
Peters (1996b) and K&ouml;nig and Br&auml;uninger (1997).
27. These definitions go back to the seminal work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947).
28. The following axioms apply with respect to winning coalitions: (1) any coalition that
contains a winning subcoalition is itself winning; formally, if S &isin;Wand S C T, then T
&isin; W (monotonicity requirement); (2) there are winning coalitions: W &ne; &empty;; (3) the empty
coalition is not winning (&empty; &ne; W). Axioms (2) and (3) ensure that trivial games are
excluded. Compare van Deemen (1997). On simple games and legislatures see, for
instance, Rapoport (1970: 207-221).
29. According to axiom (3) with regard to winning coalitions, moreover, the empty coalition
can never be winning.
30. The weighted majority game, in this case, is [3; 1,1,1].
31. In this example, the weighted majority game is given by [2; 1,1,1].
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32. A related concept to the analysis conducted here is K&ouml;nig and Br&auml;uninger’s (1997) "inclu-
siveness index." However, the focus of the present article is not so much on the individ-
ual ("In how many coalitions is a player included?" as compared to "How decisive is the
player?") but on the system as a whole, asking "How ’flexible’ is it?". K&ouml;nig and
Br&auml;uninger, however, also provide figures on the "procedural decision probability." These
figures, for the cases available, generally correspond with the ones provided here.
33. For the assumption that larger than minimum winning coalitions form in the framework
of EU decision making, see for instance Budden and Monroe (1993).
34. On the different decision rules that presently exist in the Council and repercussions in
terms of the flexibility of decision-making, see Peters (1996b).
35. For an analysis of how these quotas affect the capacity of members to participate in
"blocking minorities," see Johnston (1995a,b).
36. See Article 141 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. However, some
other decisions require a (simple) majority of the EP members. This procedure, for
instance, applies with respect to the (indirect) right of initiative that the EP has obtained
by the Maastricht Treaty: "The European Parliament may, acting by a majority of its
Members, request the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters on
which it considers that a Community act is required for the purpose of implementing
this Treaty" (Article 138b). Similarly, in the framework of the cooperation procedure,
the EP may, by an absolute (simple) majority of its component members, propose amend-
ments to the Council’s "common position" or reject it.
37. This topic is also analyzed in Hosli (1998).
38. Note, however, that the use of qualified majority votes was limited in practice due to the
Luxembourg compromise. This compromise was resorted to in the 1960s after the French
"policy of the empty chair" (basically a strategy of "exit threat" conducted by one of the
EC’s most powerful members). The compromise led to the requirement of unanimity
whenever a member state’s "crucial national interests" were at stake.
39. Note that specific decisions in the Council require both a qualified majority of weighted
votes and agreement by two-thirds of EU membership (at present, 10 out of the total of
15 members). This second requirement has tended to decrease institutional flexibility
when it was applicable.
References
Andersen, S.S. and K.A. Eliassen (1991). "European Community Lobbying." European Journal
of Political Research, 20: 173-187.
Axelrod, R. (1970). Conflict of Interest. A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics.
Chicago: Markham.
Banzhaf,J.F. (1965). "Weighted Voting Doesn’t Work: A Mathematical Analysis." Rutgers Law
Review, 19: 317-343.
Buchanan J, and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michi-
gan Press.
Budden P. and B.L. Monroe (1993). "Decision-Making in the EC Council of Ministers:" Paper
presented at the meetings of the European Community Studies Association, Washington,
DC, 26-29 May.
Colomer, J.M. and M.O. Hosli (1999). "The Power of Political Parties in the Institutions of
the European Union." In Decision Rules in the European Union. A Rational Choice Perspective
(G. Kirchgaessner, P. Moser and G. Schneider, eds.). London: Macmillan.
Council Secretariat (1995). "Tableau des votes (par domaine) pour les actes l&eacute;gislatifs
adopt&eacute;s pendant la p&eacute;riode du 6 d&eacute;cembre 1993 au 31 d&eacute;cembre 1994."
Garrett, G. and G. Tsebelis (1996). "An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmentalism."
International Organization, 50: 269-299.
Hayes-Renshaw, F., C. Lequ&egrave;sne, and P. Mayor Lopez (1989). "The Permanent Representa-
tions of the Member States to the European Communities." Journal of Common Market
Studies, 18: 119-137.
390
Hosli, M.O. (1995). "The Balance Between Small and Large: Effects of a Double Majority
System on Voting Power in the European Union." International Studies Quarterly, 39:
351-370.
Hosli, M.O. (1996). "Coalitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority Voting in the
Council of the European Union." Jour al of Common Market Studies, 34: 255-273.
Hosli, M.O. (1997). "Voting Strength in the European Parliament: The Influence of National
and of Partisan Actors." European Journal of Political Research, 31: 351-366.
Hosli, M.O. (1998). "An Institution’s Capacity To Act: What are the Effects of Majority
Voting in the Council of the EU and in the European Parliament?" Maastricht: European
Institute of Public Administration.
Johnston, R.J. (1995a). "The Conflict over Qualified Majority Voting in the European Council
of Ministers: An Analysis of the UK Negotiating Stance using Power Indices." British Journal
of Political Science, 25: 245-254.
Johnston, R.J. (1995b). "Can Power be Reduced to a Quantitative Index&mdash;and if so, Which
One? A Response to Garrett, McLean and Machover." British Journal of Political Science, 25:
568-571.
Julien, B. (1990). "Euro-Lobbying Invades Berlaymont." European Affairs, 4: 28-33.
Kilgour D.M. and T.J. Levesque (1984). "The Canadian Constitutional Amending Formula:
Bargaining in the Past and the Future." Public Choice, 44: 457-480.
K&ouml;nig, T. and T. Br&auml;uninger (1997). "The Inclusiveness of European Decision Rules." Journal
of Theoretical Politics, 7(2): 223-230.
Mazey, S.P. and J.J. Richardson (1993). "Interest Groups in the European Community." In
Pressure Groups (J.J. Richardson, ed.), pp. 191-213. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moravcsik, A. (1993). "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Inter-
governmentalist Approach." Journal of Common Market Studies, 31: 473-523.
Owen, G. (1977). "Values of Games with A Priori Unions." In Mathematical Economics and Game
Theory (R. Henn and O. Moeschlin, eds.), pp. 76-88. Berlin: Springer.
Owen, G. (1982). "Modification of the Banzhaf-Coleman Index for Games with A Priori
Unions." In Power, Voting and Voting Power (MJ. Holler, ed.), pp. 232-238. W&uuml;rzburg: Physica.
Peters, T. (1996a). "Voting Power After the Enlargement and Options for Decision Making
in the European Union." Aussenwirtschaft, 51 (2): 223-243.
Peters, T. (1996b). "Decision Making After the EU Intergovernmental Conference." European
Law Journal, (2): 3.
Petersen, N. (1997). "The Nordic Trio and the Future of the EU." In The Politics of European
Treaty Reform: The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and Beyond (G. Edwards and A. Pijpers,
eds), pp. 159-187. London and Washington: Pinter.
Pijpers, A. and S. Vanhoonacker (1997). "The Position of the Benelux Countries." In The
Politics of European Treaty Reform: The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and Beyond (G. Edwards
and A. Pijpers, eds.), pp. 119-141. London and Washington: Pinter.
Putnam, R.D. (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games."
International Organization, 42: 427-461.
Rapoport, A. (1970). N-Person Game Theory: Concepts and Applications. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.
Raunio, T. (1996). Party Group Behaviour in the European Parliament: An Analysis of Transnational
Political Groups in the 1989&mdash;94 Parliament. Tampere: University of Finland.
Shapley, L.S. and M. Shubik (1954). "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in
a Committee System." American Political Science Review, 48: 787-792.
Streeck, W. and P.C. Schmitter (1991). "From National Corporatism to Transnational Plural-
ism : Organized Interests in the Single European Market." Politics and Society, 19: 133-164.
Szukala, A. and W. Wessels (1997). "The Franco-German Tandem." In The Politics of European
Treaty Reform: The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and Beyond (G. Edwards and A. Pijpers,
eds.), pp. 74-99. London and Washington: Pinter.
Tsakaloyannis, P. (1997). "The EU and the Common Interests of the South." In: The Politics
of European Treaty Reform: The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and Beyond (G. Edwards and
A. Pijpers, eds.), pp. 142-158. London and Washington: Pinter.
391
Van Deemen, A.M.A. (1989). "Dominant Players and Minimum Size Coalitions." European
Journal of Political Research, 17: 313-332.
Van Deemen, A.M.A. (1997). Coalition Formation and Social Choice. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern (1947). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Wallace, H. (1985). "Negotiations and Coalition Formation in the European Community."
Government and Opposition, 20: 453-472.
Widgr&eacute;n, M. (1993). "A Nordic Coalition’s Influence on the EC Council of Ministers." In
European Economic Integration (J. Fagerberg and L. Lundberg, eds.), pp. 332-352. Aldershot:
Avebury.
Biographical Note
MADELEINE O. HOSLI is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at the
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. She has taught at the European Institute of
Public Administration in Maastricht, the Netherlands, and at the Graduate Insti-
tute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Her current project is a book
entitled "Power and Institutional Change: The Council of the European Union and
the European Parliament." She has published in journals such as International Organi-
zation, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Common Market Studies, and The European
Journal of Political Research. ADDRESS: Visiting Assistant Professor, University of
Michigan, ISR/CPS 4104, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248, U.S.A. [e-mail:
mhosli@umich.edu]
